Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 was not intended to be permanent, yet it continued for more than half a century. Although the occupation of Egypt might not have been the outcome of a conscious Mediterranean strategy or of a purposeful new imperialism, this is what it became. Two successful campaigns were fought from Egypt during the Great War which brought fundamental changes to the Middle East and from which Britain emerged as a major influential political and military power.

With its economic resources strained towards the end of the war, Britain had then to embark on an economic policy of military expenditure; and if Britain was to defend its Empire, its fleet had to compensate for its size by its mobility in which the Suez Canal played an important part.

On account of its climate and location as an admirable training ground, Egypt became as important to the Air Force scheme as the Suez Canal to the Navy. Egypt also became an important link in imperial air routes, and from there reinforcements to the Palestine and the Sudan garrisons could be dispatched. It is not surprising therefore that the control of Egypt became a military necessity- a reality which continued to affect Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Egyptians, who discovered by the end of the war that they were far from being independent, expressed their desire for self-government in an unfortunate manner, when they staged their uprising in 1919. Thereafter, Egyptian attempts to negotiate a treaty settlement whereby British forces would withdraw from the interior of Egypt failed. This reflected a military hegemony on the part of the British and a determination not to surrender their position in that country. British fears of an independent Egypt were twofold: a fear of being displaced by another power if British forces were to withdraw from Cairo and Alexandria, and of a militant and strong Egyptian army being influenced by the extreme nationalists. British statesmen had never lost sight of the significance of the Arabi rebellion in 1882 to the Egyptian officer class. Hence the unfortunate conclusion: the Egyptian army must be kept weak and under control.

This work seeks to cast light on the little known aspects of Anglo-Egyptian relations from the time when the Egyptians staged their uprising in March 1919 to the time when they signed a treaty in August 1936. It amplifies the story of the Egyptian campaign of murder against British subjects. It gives an account of the Egyptian higher command and the provision of armaments for the Egyptian army. It also depicts the provision for an Egyptian air force and an Egyptian air service. It debates the successive attempts to negotiate a treaty between Britain and Egypt, and draws special attention to the lasting effect that the Abyssinian crisis had on both these countries.