Variable rate subsidies
the inefficiency of in-kind transfers revisited
by Michael J. Stutzer
"The inefficiency of fixed rate consumer price subsidies, relative to cash transfers, is one of the best-known propositions in welfare economics. It has also been used to show that matching grants are a more inefficient intergovernmental aid than are lump sum grants. Furthermore, the cost of fixed rate subsidies cannot be controlled without providing a "cap" beyond which amount no subsidy is received. This paper reports, both qualitatively and quantitatively, that a broad class of variable rate price subsidies also dominates fixed rate subsidies on both counts. The relative inefficiency of matching grants compared to the variable rate Federal General Revenue Sharing program is estimated"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
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Mathematical models, Subsidies| Edition | Availability |
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1
Variable rate subsidies: the inefficiency of in-kind transfers revisited
1983, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Electronic resource
in English
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Edition Notes
Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/19/2007.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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| December 19, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| January 21, 2010 | Edited by WorkBot | add subjects and covers |
| December 11, 2009 | Created by WorkBot | add works page |