A useful and well researched book in that it also gives the background of the war and the major powers - this enables the reader to understand the period and the thinking of the principal actors; one example being how the major continental powers had learnt how to assemble large, expensive armies but not how to supply them on the move - hence the need for huge supply towns and the reluctance to commit to major battles. The main thrust of the author seems to be that too little attention has been given to the outstanding preparation, skill and cunning which Marlborough displayed on the march from Bedburg to get to Bavaria; an achievement which the author rates as highly as Blenheim, if not higher - hence the title.
Perhaps more contentiously von Auderath asserts that Marlborough and Prinz Eugen did not plan Blenheim. He produces evidence of a hastily-scribbled note from Eugen to Marlborough which shows that the two were taken by surprise on finding the Franco-Bavarians in front of them. He claims that rather than admiring the idea of a carefully-worked out strategy we should admire them the more for being able to plan the battle at such speed 'from the saddle'.
British readers may not like the fact that von Auderath attributes some of Marlborough's success at Blenheim to the fact that he was an unknown quantity to his opponents - who were far more worried about what Prinz Eugen (the famous and proven victor of many battles and sieges and who was feared throughout mainland Europe) was up to. He does give Marlborough credit for much of the overall plan and for quick and flexible thinking in changing his original intention of storming Blindheim to one of containment once he realized that the panicked French had crammed so much of their infantry reserve into the village. At least these latter points worth making and considering even if you disagree with them. Anyone interested in the period should read it.