In the critically acclaimed Jefferson Davis and His Generals Steven Woodworth showed how the failures of Davis and his military leaders in the West paved the way for Confederate defeat. In Davis and Lee at War he concludes his study of Davis as rebel commander-in-chief and shows how the lack of a unified purpose and strategy in the East sealed the Confederacy's fate.

Woodworth argues that Davis and Robert E. Lee, the South's greatest military leader, had sharply conflicting views over the proper conduct of the war. Davis was convinced that the South should fight a defensive war, to simply outlast the North's political and popular support for the war. By contrast, Lee and the other eastern generals - notably P.G.T. Beauregard, Gustavus Smith, and Stonewall Jackson - were eager for the offensive.

They were convinced that only quick and decisive battlefield victories would prevent the North from eventually defeating them with its overwhelming advantage in men and materials. The result of this tense tug-of-war was Davis's misguided pursuit of a middle ground that gave neither strategy its best chance for success.