Review Written By Bernie Weisz, Historian, Vietnam War. Contact: BernWei1@aol.com Pembroke Pines, Florida USA February 12, 2013 Title of Review: A Marine's Year in Vietnam: A Tour With No Happy Ending.

After over a forty year passage of time, author Frank Cox decided to set the record straight by documenting his personal remembrances as an Artillery Forward Observer in Echo Company, Twelve Marines during the Vietnam War. He would arrive in July of 1965, in what was known as America's "build up period," and leave in April of 1966 with memories he preferred to block. Those reminiscences are starkly recalled throughout the pages of "Lullabies For Lieutenants." Among the plethora of Vietnam War memoirs that exist, the vast majority have a sobering lament to them. Considering the fact that over 58,000 Americans were killed with 21% of those younger than age 21, it would be hard to find an upbeat memoir about a war that not only did the U.S. Government give up on, but so did an ungrateful populace. So why did Cox decide to write this book about his participation in an unpopular war after over four decades? First he allowed emerging memories as a catalyst to create the emotions of rekindled aggression and adrenalin, serving him well in his career as a stock broker. After discovering letters written home to his mother while in Vietnam, Cox's decision was made. The author explained his reason; "To honor the young Marines of that strange war who were slashed across their cheeks and throats by five foot tall, razor sharp elephant grass as they crossed into the thick green foliage hiding enemy ambush positions."

What follows are his personal resentments and indignations of a war he was involved in which was set up as a fiasco from the start. Cox served in Quang Nam, the northern province of South Vietnam militarily referred to as "I Corps" for 13 months as a Forward Observer. His job was to prepare preplanned fire missions without striking populated villages, friendly air traffic or his own troops. After determining the exact location of the enemy on his map, Cox had to decide the type of artillery and fuses to be used and call in a Fire Mission to his artillery unit. The pressure was on the author, for any miscalculation given by Cox and communicated to the Fire Direction Center to commute and fire their howitzers could result in "Friendly Fire," i.e. dead Marines. This all had to be done flawlessly within seconds. Explaining why Vietnam was different than all previous American wars, Cox wrote; "Each day held the potential for ferocious battle to suddenly erupt. In previous wars time in combat lasted only a few weeks for Marines, almost never longer than a few months, and our troops exited the scene. But not in Vietnam. A Marine's tour of duty was 13 endless months, that was the only thing he could count on and the only way to leave early was a dreadful, unacceptable option." Richard Watkins, a soldier in the 25th Infantry Division from 1969 to 1970 wrote a book called "Vietnam No Regrets." Waktins furthered Cox's statement by writing; "There were only three ways out of field in Vietnam: 1. Receive a bad enough wound, 2. get killed, or 3. serve out your time. Those were the only three options the grunts that fought the Vietnam War had. All they could do was make the best of it."

What was Frank Cox making the best of? The most inhospitable, hot and humid place in all of Southeast Asia while wearing 80 pounds of equipment on his back. This included dealing with triple canopy jungle, snakes, bugs, rotting vegetation, lack of hot food, cold water or showers while avoiding Viet Cong sniper bullets or booby traps that were omnipresent. Not only did Cox and his company have to enter villages of panic stricken and for the most part collaborationist South Vietnamese, he simultaneously had to beware of enemy mines and spider holes a VC could pop out of with lethal results. Initially optimistic when first arriving "In Country," Cox recalled; "Cocky, young, and wildly optimistic, we assumed it would be a marshmallow war ended quickly by the awesome power of the Corps unleashed against an unsophisticated, rag-tag enemy. Sure, there would be a few casualties, but none of us would be harmed." It would not take long for Cox to revise his opinion, asserting the following; "Despite all the resolve and will the Marine Corps could summon by fully applying its assets and firepower against the enemy, NVA regular troops and hardcore Viet Cong, he was never vanquished. It was his home and he knew every foot of each rice paddy, every spider hole he could climb into and cover with natural camouflage and shoot from after Marines walked past, every tree in each dense thicker, and every entrance into the elaborate tunnel honeycomb beneath his hamlets. He used the same fighting holes he had used for centuries, including recent decades when he battled the Japanese Imperial Army and later defeated French troops. He was a history major, Summa Cum Laude. We were too busy calling in medevac choppers for our grievously wounded to reflect the past." Of the 14,838 Marines killed in Vietnam, 6,480 died in Quang Nam province alone. For six years Marine units suffered casualties in the same villages their predecessors had in the same brutal manner. It's hard to learn from mistakes when history is thrown out of the mix."

Then there was the matter of "rules of engagement," i.e. being allowed to destroy civilians dwelling after being fired upon from that particular village. Marine rifle companies performed "search and destroy missions" of villages, receiving enemy sniper and mortar fire in the process. Throughout inhospitable village complexes they would also discover VC tunnel systems, fighting holes, punji traps and trench lines. Yet to Cox's indignation, the Marines could not burn down an enemy supporting village without permission. Frustration would build, not only with an unappreciative population that the U.S. was protecting from communist enslavement, but with the enemy itself. Cox elaborated; Even though in constant contact with the VC it was rare for Marine riflemen to have a chance to isolate and gun down the enemy. Victor Charlie was wily and furtive. And when it was known there had been enemy kills, rarely were the bodies found. After contact the enemy just vanished, along with his dead comrades and most of his equipment. The frustration due to delays in approval of urgently needed air and artillery strikes was visceral. Anger swelled in the hearts of the Marine troopers and their officers in rifle companies." Things would come to a head for Frank Cox, for his Company was part of the infamous August, 1965 "Cam Ne" incident. Cox explains; Upon approaching the Cam Ne complex every Marine patrol came under fire from VC snipers and infantry units consisting of close to 100 strong. The Marines encountered booby traps or mines every few yards. Marine casualties mounted while requests for artillery and air strikes were denied." Finally the rules of engagement were lifted and Marine infantrymen were given the permission from above to attack Cam Ne.

The only problem was that the American media would accompany the Marines. One sided, permanently damaging yellow journalism was to occur, equally damaging as the inaccurate portrayal of the Tet Offensive being an American debacle. CBS correspondent Morley Safer was invited to join Cox's Company as the Marines embarked on their avenging search and destroy mission of Cam Ne. Beamed back nationwide and uncensored to Americans televisions, Safer filmed Marines torching all houses in the village. While not being informed of the enemy snipers, tunnels and weaponry found, Americans saw their troops acting like sadists, using flame throwers to burn down innocent families houses instead of handing out chewing gum to children. This would never been released in either World War, Korea, Iraq or Afghanistan without being censored first. Furthermore, Safer made it a point to emphasize that the U.S. would never convince the South Vietnamese peasantry that we were on their side, winning their "hearts and minds." Igniting a burgeoning domestic antiwar movement as well as a stigma on our troops in Vietnam, Safer assured the fact that this would be the first time in history that the outcome of a major conflict was to be determined neither on the battlefield or negotiating chamber, but on the printed pages and television screens. Furthermore, Cox mentions that the broadcast created an irreparable schism between the press and American military leadership that lasted for the duration of the war.

Rich Watkins had an experience that like the author would change his attitude towards the war. When his unit approached the village of Tra Cu on a search and destroy mission, Watkins wrote; As we slowly passed the villagers, they could care less that we were there. They hardly gave us a passing glance. Half the people in this village were our enemy, the other half could care less if we lived or died. As far as they were concerned, we were just kind of there, until we weren't, I guess. I had hoped we were there to help these people or save them or something like that, but I was new and I was naïve, and my attitude would change as my tour progressed." Cox explains how his Company's attitude would change as well; the daily nicks the VC had inflicted on Marine patrols via booby traps and heavy trauma two minute ambushes had enraged us." When his Company entered a village where booby traps had been found and the village chief and its inhabitants would deny any knowledge of the enemy, Cox wrote; "No Vietnamese ever admitted knowing the whereabouts of the VC. In this part of Vietnam most sons, brothers and cousins were VC. The population knew which side their bread was buttered on; they'd take their chances with the VC." Cox also reports of bad Marine leadership, even of an officer that had a psychotic breakdown and was later promoted. As a Forward Observer, Cox lamented at how he would call an urgent fire mission while a company was under attack, ambushed and in danger of being overrun. Since his request had to be approved from the chain of command, i.e. Battalion, Regiment, Marine Division Headquarters and the South Vietnamese Army, by the time it was the enemy had vanished and Marines trapped in ambushes lost their lives. Cox wrote; It was difficult to explain those rules to the men and officers who were engaged in an up close and personal manner with the enemy and vitally needed supporting fire immediately.

There were legitimate reasons for the rules of engagement before artillery could rain shells down on Cox's coordinates. Fear existed of not only friendly fire on American troops but collateral damage as well, i.e. accidentally killing friendlies in populated areas. Cox noted the enemy ability to capitalize on this, asserting; "the Viet Cong was a savvy student and actually calculated for the artillery delay into his timeline." There were other problems Cox encountered, issues he blamed the Marine Corps Supply system on. The Marine Corps equivalent of a telephone system was communication wire, land lines a Forward Observer used to communicate with his battery's Fire Direction Center. There was a severe shortage of it, and battery powered radios were substituted. Cox recalls how aside from radio batteries being old, moldy and scare, they would go dead. Sadly, ambushed Marines would die when a Forward Observer could not communicate with his artillery unit because of an inoperable radio and request lifesaving artillery on enemy positions. Despite B-52 carpet bombings, defoliating the enemy's sanctuaries, rapidly ferrying into battles troops and evacuating wounded by helicopters, as well as incredible Brown and Blue water naval assets, Cox summed up the American experience in Vietnam as follows; "If I had been an odds maker when I returned to America in 1966, I would have unblinkingly installed the NVA/VC consortium as an overwhelming 3 to 1 favorite to win. But I'd have lost the other proposition: over or under 8 more years of war. I'd have bet under 8 more years. I couldn't have conceived how mad our leadership would become in order to let it linger on for so many years. Maybe our country needs more history majors. Our insistence and proclivity to apply quick, hi tech responses in nonindustrial hotspots fails us." Like most Vietnam Vets, Frank Cox felt the U.S. waged the war in Vietnam with hands tied behind its back, with 58,000 plus paying the ultimate price. Mr. Cox sums up his book incisively by remarking; "In the Vietnam War, if you thought it would happen, it didn't. If it happened, you never considered it." This memoir is an important addition any understanding of America's involvement with Vietnam and essential reading!