An edition of The origin of ideas
(1883)
The Origin Of Ideas
Volume 1
by Antonio Rosmini
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Table of Contents
CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
PREFACE vii
SECTION I.
PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THESE INQUIRIES.
CHAPTER I.
On the Two Principles of Philosophic Method i
CHAPTER II.
Two Philosophies: the one Vulgar, and the other Scientific ; their two Defects 3
CHAPTER III.
On the Defect of the Philosophy of Locke 7
SECTION II.
ON THE NATURE OF THE DIFFICULTY TO BE OVERCOME IN EXPLAINING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS: — THE DIFFICULTY STATED.
SECTION III.
THEORIES WHICH ERR BY DEFECT — THAT IS, BY NOT ASSIGNING TO IDEAS AN ADEQUATE CAUSE.
CHAPTER I.
LOCKE.
I. The System of Locke 18
II. Locke, when coming to account for the Origin of the Idea of Substance, stumbles upon the Difficulty, but does not perceive it 18
III. Without the Idea of Substance the Development of our Intellectual Life would be impossible 20
IV. Why the Idea of Substance cannot come from Sensations alone 21
V. The Difficulty found in explaining the Origin of the Idea of Substance is the same as that which I have stated in another form 24
VI. Conclusion on the Imperfection of the System of Locke 32
CHAPTER II.
CONDILLAC
I. Objections raised by D’Alembert against the System of Locke 35
II. Locke censured by Condillac 38
III. The System of Condillac 39
IV. Defectiveness of Condillac’s Analysis 41
V. Intellectual Attention is not the same thing as Sensitivity 41
VI. Memory is not Sensitivity 44
VII. Attention is different from Memory 46
VIII. Judgment must not be confounded with simple Attention 47
IX. Condillac stumbles upon the Difficulty without perceiving it : that is, he accounts for the Formation of Ideas by unconsciously Begging the Question 49
X. In every representative Apprehension we contemplate a
Universal : hence the Difficulty is seen still more
clearly in the Theory of Condillac, and remains in it unsolved 53
XI. Continuation 60
XII. Conclusion on the Intrinsic Defect of the System of Condillac 63
CHAPTER III.
REID.
I. Origin of the Scottish School 65
II. System of Reid on the Distinction of the Human Faculties 68
III. The Difficulty as seen by Dr. Reid 73
IV. The Difficulty found by Dr. Reid in the System of Locke had in some way been perceived by Locke himself 75
V. Objection urged by Reid against Locke 77
VI. Reid places Judgment before Ideas 78
VII. Dr. Reid maintains, against Locke, that the First Operation of the Human Mind is, not Analytic, but Synthetic 79
VIII. The System proposed by Dr. Reid cannot be considered satisfactory 79
IX. Defect common to Reid and his Adversaries 83
X. The part in which the System of Reid holds good as against that of his Adversaries 91
XI. Conclusion 94
CHAPTER IV.
DUGALD STEWART
I. Various Aspects of the Difficulty 96
II. Dugald Stewart grounds his Theory on a Passage of Adam Smith 98
III. Defects in the above Passage. — First Defect : It does not distinguish the several Species of Names indicating Multitudes of Individuals 100
IV. Second Defect : Smith does not distinguish the Names indicating Multitudes of Individuals from those which indicate Abstract Qualities 102
V. Third Defect : Smith confounds with Common Nouns the Names indicating Multitudes of Individuals and those indicating Abstract Qualities 103
VI. Fourth Defect : Smith does not understand the true Distinction between Common and Proper Nouns 105
VII. Fifth Defect : Smith does not understand the Reason why Common Nouns and Proper Nouns are severally so called 106
VIII. Sixth Defect: Smith does not see that the first Names given to things were Common Nouns 108
IX. Seventh Defect : Smith does not see that to know in things that which is ‘common' is easier than to know that which is ‘proper' 114
X. Eighth Defect : Smith does not know in what way Common Nouns pass into being used as Proper 115
XI. Ninth Defect : Smith, while professing to explain Abstract Ideas, gives no such Explanation at all 121
XII. Tenth Defect : The language of Smith throws a veil over the true Point of the Difficulty to be overcome in explaining the Origin of Abstract Ideas 123
XIII. What Form the Ideological Problem takes in the Reasonings of Smith and Dugald Stewart 130
XIV. The System of the Nominalists does not solve the Ideological Problem 130
XV. How Dugald Stewart’s Error originated 131
XVI. The Theory of Dugald Stewart sins by a petitio principii 132
XVII. Another Error of Dugald Stewart 136
XVIII. Other Errors of Dugald Stewart : the Inadequacy of his Theory to solve the Ideological Problem is further demonstrated 138
XIX. The Nominalism of Dugald Stewart flows from the Principles of Reid 148
XX. In explaining how our Mind conceives the Similarity of Objects, the same Difficulty is met with under another aspect 151
XXI. In explaining how Individuals can be Classified, the same Difficulty presents itself again 151
XXII. Uncertainty observable in the Expressions used by Dugald Stewart 158
XXIII. Dugald Stewart confounds together two Questions which are totally distinct 159
XXIV. Dugald Stewart does not understand the Doctrines of the ancient Philosophers whom he censures, concerning the Formation of Genera and Species 160
XXV. Dugald Stewart does not understand the Question debated between the Realists, the Conceptualists, and the Nominalists 162
XXVI. Dugald Stewart confounds the Question of the Necessity of Language with that of the Existence of Universal 164
XXVII. Another petitio principii : Dugald Stewart, while professing to explain how the Mind forms the Ideas of Genera and Species, begins by presupposing these ideas as already formed 166
XXVIII. Another petitio principii : Dugald Stewart assumes that General Ideas are something, in the very discussion in which he attempts to prove that they are mere Names 167
XXIX. The Use of Signs does not suffice to account for our Knowledge of Universals 169
XXX. Another Fallacy in the Mode of Reasoning adopted by Dugald Stewart 172
XXXI. Conclusion : The Scottish School, conscious of its inability to overcome the difficulty in question, has tried in vain to eliminate it from Philosophy 176
CHAPTER V.
What Steps has Philosophy made by means of the Systems we have examined thus far? 177
SECTION IV.
THEORIES WHICH ERR BY EXCESS — THAT IS, BY ASSIGNING TO IDEAS A GREATER CAUSE THAN IS NECESSARY.
CHAPTER I.
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.
I. The Difficulty of the Problem of the Origin of Ideas as proposed by Plato 188
II. Plato’s Solution of the Difficulty 190
III. The Difficulty seen by Plato is in substance the same as that which has been proposed in these pages 192
IV. The System of Plato solves the Difficulty, but is at the same time Vitiated by Excess 196
V. Aristotle points out the Inaccuracy of Plato’s Reasoning 201
VI. Its Defect notwithstanding, the Reasoning of Plato contains an Element of solid Truth 203
VII. Aristotle does not seem to give an adequate Explanation of Universals 204
VIII. From some passages in the Works of Aristotle it would seem that he did not sufficiently mark the Distinction between Sense and Understanding 207
IX. According to Themistius’s Paraphrase, Aristotle did not properly understand the Nature of the Universal 213
X. To Judge is more than to Apprehend the Universal 215
XI. Absurdity of the Doctrine expounded by Themistius 216
XII. Contradiction between two Opinions of Aristotle 220
XIII. The Difficulty pointed out in this Discussion was perceived by the Schoolmen, as is proved from a Distinction which they invented in order to meet it. That Distinction is examined 222
XIV. The intellects agens of Aristotle does not account for the Origin of Universals 226
XV. According to Aristotle, the Understanding communicates its own Form to the things perceived by it. This, taken in conjunction with the Denial of all Innate Ideas, is the Foundation of Modern Scepticism 230
XVI. An Aristotelian self-contradiction 232
XVII. According to the System just expounded, the Understanding would operate blindly : Absurdity of this 233
XVIII. Aristotle catches a glimpse of the True Doctrine 234
XIX. The Hint of the True Doctrine given by Aristotle is explained 236
XX. Aristotle acknowledges that the Human Understanding carries with it by Nature a Light, as attested by Mankind generally 237
XXI. The Arabians, by denying the Existence of a Light Innate in Man, fell into the erroneous Doctrine that the intellectus agens was outside of the Human Soul 240
XXII. St. Thomas refutes the Error of the Arabians 242
XXIII. Credit due to Aristotle for having seen the Necessity of an Innate Primitive Act in the Human Understanding 243
XXIV. According to the Interpretation of Egidius, the Indeterminate Habits hinted at by Aristotle are Innate in the Human Soul 248
XXV. Conclusion on Aristotle 248
XXVI. Two Kinds of Doctrine in Plato 249
CHAPTER II.
LEIBNITZ
I. The Difficulty to be overcome in accounting for the Origin of Ideas was seen by Leibnitz 259
II. Leibnitz was led to perceive the Difficulty by the Analysis, not of the Intellectual Faculty in Particular, but of Powers in General 262
III. Leibnitz saw the Difficulty imperfectly because he deduced it from Principles which were too General 263
IV. Leibnitzian Solution of the Difficulty 266
V. How Innate Ideas as understood by Leibnitz are made successively to pass from a Confused to a Luminous State 269
VI. Merit of Leibnitz in this Question 270
VII. Leibnitz admits less of the Innate than Plato 277
VIII. To explain the Existence of Human Ideas, Leibnitz assumes more of the Innate than is necessary 278
IX. Other errors of the Leibnitzian Theory 279
X. Conclusion as to the Theory of Leibnitz 284
CHAPTER III.
KANT
I. Kant, without any Examination, takes for granted the Principle of Locke, that 'all Human Knowledge comes from Experience' 286
II. In his Opposition to Locke, Kant imitated Leibnitz 288
III. Two Species of Knowledge, the one a priori and the other a posteriori, admitted by all Philosophical Schools 289
IV. The Characteristics of a priori and of a posteriori Knowledge 292
V. Hume, by discarding a portion of a priori Knowledge, induces Scepticism 297
VI. No Portion of a priori Knowledge can be explained by Means of the Senses 301
VII. How it was Attempted to Confute the Scepticism of Hume 305
VIII. A more effectual Way of Confuting the Scepticism of Hume 307
IX. Reid rejects the Principle of Locke, and acknowledges the Existence of a priori Cognitions 309
X. The Theory of Reid does not run clear of Scepticism 311
XI. Kant deduces his Scepticism from the Fundamental Principle of Reid, even as Hume had deduced his from die fundamental Principle of Locke 314
XII. The Doctrine of Kant stated : he distinguishes Two Parts in our Cognitions — i.e. form and matter 315
XIII. How Kant seeks to prevent the chaise of Idealism 318
XIV. How Kant seeks to prevent the charge of Scepticism 319
XV. The Fundamental Error of the Philosophy of Kant 321
XVI. Another Error of the Philosophy of Kant 326
XVII. An Objection answered 329
XVIII. Philosophical Merit of Kant : he was fully sensible of
the fact that to Think is nothing but to Judge 333
XIX. Kant saw very distinctly the nature of the difficulty to be overcome in accounting for the Origin of Human Cognitions 333
XX. Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments 335
XXI. The General Problem of Philosophy as stated by Kant 336
XXII. Is it true that we make Synthetical a priori Judgments? 339
XXIII. Is the Proposition, ‘Everything that Happens must have a Cause,’ a Synthetical a priori Judgment in the Kantian sense? 342
XXIV. The Ideological Problem was not properly stated by Kant 347
XXV. The Nature of the Ideological Problem is still more clearly set forth 348
XXVI. Are the First Judgments, through which we form the Concepts of Things, Synthetical in the Kantian sense? 350
XXVII. The Kantian Solution of the Ideological Problem 358
XXVIII. Kant did not understand the Nature of Intellectual Perception 361
XXIX. In what he admits as Innate in the Human Spirit, Kant errs at once by Defect and by Excess 362
XXX. Conclusion 364
CHAPTER IV.
HOW PHILOSOPHY MAY BE SAID TO HAVE PROGRESSED BY MEANS OF PLATO, LEIBNITZ, AND KANT; AND WHAT IT STILL REQUIRES IN ORDER TO BE PERFECT.
I. Recapitulation of the Three Systems 366
II. How the Kantian Forms are Vitiated by Excess, and how they are all Reducible to one only Form 370
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