From the publisher's website:

"This book is a lively account of the First Amendment concept of pure speech as in its intellectual origins both an expression of dissent against tyranny as observed by 16th century protestant reformers as well as a foundation for an ingenious development of legal philosophy that incorporates violent aspects of reformed theology into a just and egalitarian legal framework.This book provides a fresh and challenging look at the reformers` "two kingdom" theory and its related theological doctrine of justification, demonstrating a clear parallel between the reformerspreoccupation with social justice as a matter to be viewed through the unique lens of the transcendence of the spirit and the U.S. Supreme Courts compelling interest test grounded in counter-socialism. The book proceeds to discuss different current uses of freedom of speech to show the continued relevance of reformed theology’s emphasis on a sharp distinction between good and evil to First Amendment debate. What are the implications for freedom of religion if this freedom is treated as a form of pure speech without reference to traditional theological concepts? Why are current cases that appear to look at religion in secular pure-speech-associated terms in fact putting forth a particularly ingenious ‘religious’ view of religion?

The author discusses among others the reasonable observer test enunciated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in the Supreme Court case Lynch v. Donnelly and the recent Supreme Court cases Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder and Citizens United v. FEC to put the provocative question that what can appear as a secular counter-tyranny ambition may have an unexpected religious metaphysical dimension..

This book explains why and how theological doctrine of the protestant reformation such as regeneration, atonement, and the two kingdom theory has become a part of the Enlightenment legal philosophy that shapes the American First Amendment constitutional law tradition;

This book discusses the different uses of the reasonable observer standard enunciated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly in recent freedom of religion cases; why and how is this test significant for a civil ethics beyond an exclusively legal elements analysis of the First Ademendment?

What are the implications for freedom of speech when freedom of religion is treated as a form of pure speech? How does the Supreme Court define religion in this context? Why are cases that appear to look at religion in secular and psychological terms in fact putting forth a deeply religious view of religion?

Why and how should national security be defined in terms of free speech pursuant to Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder? Why was the 6th. Circuit case ACLU v. NSA wrongly decided in this context?

What are the implications for a civic ethics of an invisible hand theory for free speech pursuant to Citizens United v. FEC?

Do contemporary freedom of religion and speech cases draw a bright line between good speech and bad speech? What are the political implications of a bright line that distinguishes between different forms of socialism as bad speech and a communal liberal rationalism as good speech?"