Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version)

Understanding and managing risk in security s ...
National Research Council (U.S ...
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Last edited by ImportBot
August 2, 2020 | History

Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version)

A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility--in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable resources toward maintaining effective security at facilities that house its nuclear assets. However, particularly in a budget-constrained environment, it is essential that these assets are also secured efficiently, meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on the primary missions of the organizations that operate U.S. nuclear facilities. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM--asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative, and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities associated with them. However, using structured thinking processes and techniques to characterize security risk could improve NNSA's understanding of security vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource allocation.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
13

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"This is an abbreviated version of the National Academies' report on augmenting DOE's security systems at sites in the nuclear weapons complex, and particularly on the applicability of risk assessment concepts for this augmentation. The full report is entitled Understanding and managing risk in the DOE nuclear weapons complex. The full version of that report, which is exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. [section] 552 (b)(2), was issued in 2010.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 6).

Also available in Open Book format via the National Academies Press home page.

Published in
Washington, D.C

Classifications

Library of Congress
U264.3 .N367 2011,

The Physical Object

Pagination
xv, 13 p. ;
Number of pages
13

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL25079187M
ISBN 10
030920884X
ISBN 13
9780309208840
LCCN
2011282673
OCLC/WorldCat
725437054

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August 2, 2020 Edited by ImportBot import existing book
October 27, 2011 Created by LC Bot import new book