This work analyses British perceptions of, and foreign and strategic policies towards, France from 1936 to 1940, from the perspectives of British officials, politicians and senior military, naval and air officers. Faced with the potentially hostile combination of Germany, Italy and Japan, with the United States having retreated into isolation, and while British politicians were deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union, France was Britain's only dependable ally.

Yet the British did nothing to sustain its morale, refusing to promise to send the British army to France in the event of German aggression or to engage in meaningful staff talks. Indeed, elite British opinion-formers reviled France for its supposed political instability, decadence and economic decline. After Munich all this changed as the British, finally accepting that they would not reach an acceptable agreement with Germany, and fearing isolation on the continent, mended their fences with France and embarked on close military, naval, air and economic cooperation with that country.

Anglo-French collaboration reached its peak during the 'Phoney War', but relations between the two countries were almost completely sundered after the fall of France in June 1940.