"Tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem have escalated since Turkey harshly criticized Israel following its invasion of the Gaza Strip in December 2008 (Operation Cast Lead). The operation aimed to halt continuous missile attacks on Israel's civilian population by Hamas. Soon after, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's outburst at Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009 indicated further cooling between the two powers. Additionally, in October 2009 Turkey abruptly canceled Israel's participation in the multinational "Anatolian Eagle" air exercise. This was followed by Turkish political leaders' severe criticism of Israeli policies. Subsequently, an inflammatory anti-Israeli drama series on Turkey's state-controlled television station depicting IDF soldiers as cold-blooded murderers and rapists only exacerbated tensions. Since the fall of 2009, hardly a week has passed without Erdogan slamming Israel. Finally, Israeli military action to prevent the "Gaza flotilla" from breaking the blockade on the Hamas-ruled Strip in June 2010, which ended with nine Turkish Islamists dead on board one of the ships, provided Erdogan's government another opportunity for hostility toward Israel as it championed the cause of Hamas. The deterioration in the Ankara-Jerusalem relationship is part of a reorientation in Turkish foreign policy, characterized by moving away from the West and by a desire for better relations with Muslim states, including radical actors such as Iran, Hamas and Hizballah. The first section of this article reviews the rationale for the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership in the 1990s and the early years of this century. The second part documents the deviations in Turkish foreign policy from Western patterns. The third section explains how changes in Turkey's strategic environment, as well as in its domestic arena, in the twenty-first century have led to a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy and to current tensions in bilateral relations. The fourth part offers an assessment of the potential impact of the changes in Turkish foreign policy on the Greater Middle East and global politics."--P. [1]-2.

Turkey's foreign policy has significantly changed. Jerusalem is unlikely to accept Ankara as a mediator in its disputes with Syria and the Palestinians. In all probability, arms sales and strategic cooperation will no longer be possible, while diplomatic and economic relations will only marginally be affected. Turkey understands that its regional aspirations require a certain level of diplomatic relations with Israel, an important player in the Middle East. Jerusalem still wonders why Ankara prefers the dictators of Tehran, Damascus, Khartum and Gaza over the democracy of the Jewish state. But Israel has no interest in further deterioration, and so far it is reluctant to publicly declare that AKP-ruled Turkey hardly belongs to the Western camp. Turkey's major foreign policy orientation should be of great concern to the West. Western capitals are slow in gauging changes in the domestic and foreign politics of Turkey. Washington still plays with the idea that Ankara represents 'moderate Islam.' Yet, Turkey's preferences and policies are anything but moderate. Seeking good relations with Iran and Sudan, as well as with Hamas and Hizballah, puts Turkey squarely in a radical Islamist camp. Turkey is an important country whose foreign policy reorientation changes the balance of power in the Middle East in favor of the radical Islamist forces. It affects negatively the pro-Western orientation of the Central Asian republics. It considerably weakens the Western alliance, NATO in particular, and could also revive the historic Muslim threat to Europe from the East.