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Throughout the Vietnam War, military officials such as Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Harold K. Johnson, Wallace Greene, Victor Krulak, and John Paul Vann consistently warned against the peril of waging conventional war in Vietnam, while even advocates of U.S. involvement like William Westmoreland and Earle Wheeler recognized the political and military obstacles to American success.
Within the armed forces, there was further division over the Army-devised strategy of attrition, as well as constant feuding with the White House to avoid blame for the likely failure in Indochina.
Masters of War convincingly disproves the claim that America's defeat was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B.
Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs." Robert Buzzanco demonstrates that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policy makers always understood the problems of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped draw the United States into the conflict.
For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam: Buzzanco proves that the war was lost on the ground in Vietnam, not because of politicians or antiwar movements at home.
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Subjects
Politics and government, Protest movements, Political activity, Armed Forces, Vietnam War, 1961-1975, Etats-Unis, Guerre du Viet-Nam (1961-1975), Kritiek (algemeen), 15.85 history of America, Activité politique, Forces armées, Résistance politique, Mouvements contestataires, Vietnam-oorlog, Histoire, Vietnam War (1961-1975) fast (OCoLC)fst01431664, 89.80 military science: general, Politique et gouvernement, Militairen, Vietnam war, 1961-1975, protest movements, United states, armed forces, United states, politics and government, 1963-1969, United states, politics and government, 1969-1974, United states, history, militaryEdition | Availability |
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1
Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era
2012, Cambridge University Press
in English
0511664966 9780511664960
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2
Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era
February 28, 1997, Cambridge University Press
Paperback
in English
- New Ed edition
0521599407 9780521599405
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3
Masters of war: military dissent and politics in the Vietnam era
1996, Cambridge University Press
in English
0521480469 9780521480468
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zzzz
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Book Details
First Sentence
"Although American leaders in the following decade would establish Vietnam as the central battlefield in the global cold war, U.S. military officials in the 1950s consistently opposed expanded commitments to and intervention in Indochina."
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