In this book, Bruce Blair evaluates operational safety hazards resulting from the deployment of launch-ready nuclear forces in Russia and the United States. He provides new information on command and control procedures and deficiencies that increase the risks of accidental or unauthorized launching of ballistic missiles, particularly those in the former Soviet Union.

Blair proposes changes in nuclear operations and deployment that would improve safety. Remedies range from detargeting missiles to taking all nuclear forces off alert ("zero alert") so that no weapons are poised for immediate launch. In the zero alert mode, strategic nuclear bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles would not have nuclear warheads or other vital components in place and would require extensive preparations for launch.

Blair assesses the effects of zero alert on strategic deterrence and crisis stability in the event of a revival of nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia, destablization in the former Soviet Union, or a threat posed by some emerging nuclear power. He also describes the burdens of verification that his remedies impose.