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Many companies operate units which are dispersed across different types of markets, and thus serve significantly diverging customer bases. Such market-type dispersion is likely to compromise the headquarters' ability to control its local managers' behavior and satisfy the divergent needs of different types of customers. In this paper we find evidence that market-type dispersion is an important determinant of delegation and the provision of incentives. Using a sample of convenience store chains, we show that market-type dispersion is related to the degree of franchising at the chain level as well as the probability of franchising a given store within a chain.
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Organizational design and control across multiple markets: the case of franchising in the convenience store industry
2008, Harvard Business School
in English
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"April 2008"--Publisher's web site.
Includes bibliographical references.
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May 28, 2023 | Created by MARC Bot | import new book |