In this book, the author of Disaster at Bari
gives a full, detailed account of "Operation
Frantic Joe" the only major attempt at cooperation
between the United States and the
Soviet Union during World War II—and a
painfully accurate foreshadowing of the course
of post-war relations between the two countries.
The plan was simple: U.S. bombers taking
off from England would bomb strategic targets
in Eastern Germany, and land at Soviet bases
to refuel before completing the shuttle run
back to England. Not only would these hard-toreach
targets be struck, but in addition, President
Roosevelt and American military planners
hoped, the operation would cause the Nazis to
move more forces to the Eastern Front—weakening
their defenses in France, where the Allies
were planning to land—and open the way to
closer cooperation with the U.S.S.R.
Glenn B. Infield's account—based on a careful
study of recently de-classified documents
and interviews with many of the participants
—shows why all three goals were destined for
failure almost from the outset. He traces the
tortuous seven months of formal negotiations
—Stalin demanding and often receiving topsecret
U.S. intelligence and equipment in return
for his cooperation; the Americans, while meeting
these demands, having to agree to sharp
reductions in the number of bases proposed,
the number of servicemen who could be stationed
there, the corridors the incoming planes
could use, the quantity and type of navigation
aids, even the enemy targets to be bombed.
But the fatal compromise, Infield indicates,
was in the area of base defense. Stalin insisted
that the Russians provide all air defense for the
bases, and the Americans, eager to stage the
first "Frantic" mission before D-Day, granted
him this point too. The inadequacy of these
arrangements became clear shortly after the
second "Frantic" task force landed in Russia.
On the night of June 21, 1944. the Luftwaffe
attacked the American air base at Poltava. Unchallenged
by the Red Air Force, the Germans
bombed the field for more than an hour, damaging
or destroying more than sixty B-17S,
along with virtually the entire supply of fuel,
ammunition, and material at Poltava.
Why did this tragedy occur? Infield has unearthed
evidence that it probably happened on
orders from the Kremlin. Stalin, he maintains,
was looking not toward the immediate goal of
defeating the Axis powers, but toward his own
long-range plans for world domination: the
Soviet dictator saw "Operation Frantic" as a
way of making U.S. forces look impotent,
while still making possible the continued flow
of American military equipment and knowhow.
As a result, the hard work of many courageous
and resourceful men—captured in Infield's
astute character sketches and vivid
combat narratives—was largely wasted.
But the greatest tragedy, Infield writes, was
the failure by all the Americans involved to
recognize that this strange and strained alliance
with Russia could only be short-lived, and that
the Poltava affair was a clear warning of the
rigid polarization that would mark the postwar
world.
G L E N N B. I N F I E L D is a former pilot and
major in the United States Air Force. He has
been a writer—primarily in the fields of aviation
and military history—for 20 years; his
books include Unarmed and Unafraid, a history
of aerial reconnaissance, and Disaster at
Bari, the story of the top-secret World War II
catastrophe that released 100 tons of poison
gas in an Italian harbor.