This book fills an immense need to explain why, despite the enormous resources in capital and intelligence devoted to the problems of war and peace, most military conflicts in the twentieth century have been unpredicted; why political scientists failed to foresee the collapse of empires; and why economists forecast growth when there was obvious decay.

The book describes how the Soviet Union and the United States nearly put an end to world civilization. Through intelligence channels, the Soviets knew that top US officials repeatedly considered the use of nuclear weapons, and they understood those threats were serious. Each side, acting out its own interpretation of 'the other' according to its ethnocentric vision, came close to unleashing a catastrophe in the name of 'reason'.

It is the dilemma of any analyst in any culture that he or she cannot reliably see beyond his or her own cultural walls. One's own culture defines what is 'real' or 'not real'. That is why so many military analysts make such mistaken predictions. They assume that the enemy sees what they do. Living behind a cultural wall, analysts - often not knowing that the wall is there - need a guide to help them to see over it.

That guide is given in this book in a checklist of anthropological, cultural and behavioral factors that filter military and political predictions.

This important book develops and tests a new theory about the role of cultures in controlling perception and lays the foundation for a method of analysis of enormous value in intelligence prediction. It is written for the military and political studies communities, military intelligence and government analysts, and all those concerned with conflict resolution and the threat of war.