Check nearby libraries
Buy this book
![Loading indicator](/images/ajax-loader-bar.gif)
"This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit. I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, the optimal fine for misrepresenting one's wealth level, and the optimal audit probability. I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealth equals the fine for the offense divided by the audit probability, and therefore generally exceeds the fine for the offense. The optimal audit probability is positive, increases as the cost of an audit declines, and equals unity if the cost is sufficiently low. If the optimal audit probability is less than unity, there are some individuals who are capable of paying the fine for the offense who misrepresent their wealth levels. I also show that the optimal fine for the offense results in underdeterrence due to the cost of auditing wealth levels"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Check nearby libraries
Buy this book
![Loading indicator](/images/ajax-loader-bar.gif)
Edition | Availability |
---|---|
1
Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
|
aaaa
Libraries near you:
WorldCat
|
2
Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
|
zzzz
|
Book Details
Edition Notes
"September 2004."
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).
The Physical Object
ID Numbers
Community Reviews (0)
Feedback?December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
December 3, 2010 | Edited by Open Library Bot | Added subjects from MARC records. |
December 10, 2009 | Created by WorkBot | add works page |