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"It is typically difficult to determine whether households save optimally. But in some cases, savings incentives are strong enough to imply sharp normative restrictions. We consider employees who receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) plan and are allowed to make discretionary, penalty-free, in-service withdrawals. For these employees, contributing below the match threshold is a dominated action. Nevertheless, half of employees with these clear-cut incentives do contribute below the match threshold, foregoing matching contributions that average 1.3% of their annual pay. Providing these "undersavers" with specific information about the free lunch they are giving up fails to raise their contribution rates"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subjects
401(k) plans, Mathematical models, Saving and investmentShowing 1 featured edition. View all 1 editions?
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1
$100 bills on the sidewalk: suboptimal saving in 401(k) plans
2005, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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The Physical Object
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Feedback?December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
December 5, 2010 | Edited by Open Library Bot | Added subjects from MARC records. |
December 10, 2009 | Created by WorkBot | add works page |