While the factors affecting the initiation of war have been extensively studied, the factors which determine the outcome of war have been neglected. Using quantitative data and historical illustrations from the early 1800s to the late 1980s Allan Stam investigates the relative effect on war outcomes of both the choices leaders must make during war and the resources they have at their disposal.

Strategy choices, along with decisions about troop levels and defense spending, are not made in a vacuum, according to Stam, but are made in the crucible of domestic politics. While there are best ways to fight war, because of domestic political constraints states must frequently make suboptimal choices - a trade-off of security in the international arena for political gains at home.

Stam shows how we must go beyond simply counting resources and look at the process or strategy by which they are employed as the key factor determining who will win or lose. This book should be of interest to political scientists studying war and conflict in the international system as well as historians and military strategists interested in understanding the factors predicting the outcome of war.