Does trade foster contract enforcement?
by James E. Anderson
"Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Buy this book
Showing 1 featured edition. View all 1 editions?
| Edition | Availability |
|---|---|
1
Does trade foster contract enforcement?
2008, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
|
aaaa
|
Book Details
Edition Notes
Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/10/2008.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Classifications
The Physical Object
ID Numbers
Community Reviews (0)
Feedback?
History
- Created September 27, 2008
- 5 revisions
Wikipedia citation
×CloseCopy and paste this code into your Wikipedia page. Need help?
| December 22, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| July 31, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
| December 15, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| October 28, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | Found a matching Library of Congress MARC record |
| September 27, 2008 | Created by ImportBot | Imported from Library of Congress MARC record |