| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part36.utf8:75294449:1748 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part36.utf8:75294449:1748?format=raw |
LEADER: 01748cam a22002777a 4500
001 2008610875
003 DLC
005 20080814092135.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 080710s2008 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2008610875
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aAnderson, James E.$q(James Everett),$d1943-
245 10 $aDoes trade foster contract enforcement?$h[electronic resource] /$cJames E. Anderson.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2008.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 14045
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 7/10/2008.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 14045.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w14045