An edition of Do elections always motivate incumbents? (2003)

Do elections always motivate incumbents?

experimentation vs. career concerns

by

Do elections always motivate incumbents?
Eric Le Borgne, Eric Le Borgne
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Last edited by ImportBot
August 17, 2022 | History
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An edition of Do elections always motivate incumbents? (2003)

Do elections always motivate incumbents?

experimentation vs. career concerns

by

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Publish Date
Publisher
International Monetary Fund, Research Department
Language
English
Pages
31

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Subjects

Civil service, Incumbency (Public officers), Election, Production functions (Economic theory)
Edition Availability
Cover of: Do elections always motivate incumbents?
Do elections always motivate incumbents?: experimentation vs. career concerns
2003, International Monetary Fund, Research Department
in English

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Book Details

Edition Notes

Cover title.

"March 2003"--P. [1].

Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31)

Also available on the World Wide Web.

Published in
[Washington, D.C.]
Series
IMF working paper -- WP/03/57

Classifications

Library of Congress
T185

The Physical Object

Pagination
31 p. ;
Number of pages
31

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL19384469M

Source records

Better World Books record
Better World Books record
Better World Books record

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History

Download catalog record: RDF / JSON / OPDS | Wikipedia citation
August 17, 2022 Edited by ImportBot import existing book
August 17, 2022 Edited by ImportBot import existing book
August 17, 2022 Edited by ImportBot import existing book
December 15, 2009 Edited by WorkBot link works
October 21, 2008 Created by ImportBot Imported from University of Toronto MARC record