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"We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Labor supply of politicians
2012, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/28/2012.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created March 15, 2012
- 3 revisions
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October 17, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
July 29, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
March 15, 2012 | Created by LC Bot | Imported from Library of Congress MARC record |