An edition of Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement (2002)

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

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Competitive equilibria with limited enforceme ...
Patrick J. Kehoe
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Last edited by MARC Bot
December 11, 2020 | History
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An edition of Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement (2002)

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

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"We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations.In a pure exchange economy, these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt.In an economy with capital, these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt.The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality.The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.

Publish Date
Publisher
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept.
Language
English

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Subjects
Credit, Equilibrium (Economics), External Debts, Foreign Investments, International trade, Mathematical models, Taxation

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
2003, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Electronic resource in English
Cover of: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
2002, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
Cover of: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
2002, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept.
Electronic resource in English
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Book Details

Edition Notes

Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file (viewed on Mar. 10, 2004).
"April 2002."
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
[Minneapolis, MN]
Series
Working paper / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept. ;, 621, Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis : Online) ;, 621.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL3389240M
LCCN
2004615432

Source records

Library of Congress MARC record

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December 11, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
July 31, 2012 Edited by VacuumBot Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource'
December 12, 2009 Edited by WorkBot link works
October 31, 2008 Edited by ImportBot add URIs from original MARC record
April 1, 2008 Created by an anonymous user Imported from Scriblio MARC record