Are perks purely managerial excess?

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Are perks purely managerial excess?
Raghuram Rajan, Raghuram Rajan
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Last edited by MARC Bot
December 13, 2020 | History

Are perks purely managerial excess?

  • 1 Want to read

"Why do some firms tend to offer executives a variety of perks while others offer none at all? A widespread view in the corporate finance literature is that executive perks are a form of agency or private benefit and a way for managers to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates. According to this view, firms with plenty of free cash flow that operate in industries with limited investment prospects should typically offer perks. The theory also suggests that firms that are subject to more external monitoring should have fewer perks. Overall, the evidence for the private benefits explanation is, at best, mixed. We do, however, find evidence that perks are offered most in situations where they are likely to enhance managerial productivity. This suggests that a view of perks that sees them purely as managerial excess is incorrect"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Publish Date
Language
English

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Cover of: Are perks purely managerial excess?
Are perks purely managerial excess?
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Cambridge, MA
Series
NBER working paper series ;, working paper 10494, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 10494.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL3476088M
LCCN
2005615545

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December 13, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
December 5, 2010 Edited by Open Library Bot Added subjects from MARC records.
December 10, 2009 Created by WorkBot add works page