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"We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subjects
Corporations, Executives, Finance, Mathematical models, SalariesEdition | Availability |
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A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation
2005, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/27/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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Feedback?December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
December 5, 2010 | Edited by Open Library Bot | Added subjects from MARC records. |
December 10, 2009 | Created by WorkBot | add works page |