Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
by Lucian A. Bebchuk
"This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subjects
Employee fringe benefits, Executives, PensionsShowing 2 featured editions. View all 2 editions?
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Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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