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"Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also, why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortified? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoffs from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoffs from a default to war, and (2) their promises not to attack are credible. This premise directs the analysis to such factors as the advantage of attacking over both defending and counterattacking, the divisibility of the contested territory, the possibility of recurring war, the depreciation or obsolescence of fortifications, and inequality in the effectiveness of mobilized resources"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subjects
Boundary disputes, Causes, International relations, National Territory, WarShowing 2 featured editions. View all 2 editions?
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Peace and war in territorial disputes
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Edition Notes
Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 5 revisions
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December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
July 31, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
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October 31, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | add URIs from original MARC record |
April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |